Using Chimeric Users to Construct Fusion Classifiers in Biometric Authentication Tasks: An Investigation by Poh, Norman & Bengio, Samy
USING CHIMERIC USERS TO CONSTRUCT FUSION CLASSIFIERS IN BIOMETRIC
AUTHENTICATION TASKS: AN INVESTIGATION
Norman Poh and Samy Bengio
IDIAP Research Institute, CP 592, 1920 Martigny, Switzerland, and
Ecole Polytechnique Fe´de´rale de Lausanne (EPFL), Lausanne, Switzerland.
{norman,bengio}@idiap.ch
ABSTRACT
Chimeric users have recently been proposed in the field of biometric
person authentication as a way to overcome the problem of lack of
real multimodal biometric databases as well as an important privacy
issue – the fact that too many biometric modalities of a same per-
son stored in a single location can present a higher risk of identity
theft. While the privacy problem is indeed solved using chimeric
users, it is still an open question of how such chimeric database
can be efficiently used. For instance, the following two questions
arise: i) Is the performance measured on a chimeric database a good
predictor of that measured on a real-user database?, and, ii) can a
chimeric database be exploited to improve the generalization per-
formance of a fusion operator on a real-user database?. Based on
a considerable amount of empirical biometric person authentication
experiments (21 real-user data sets and up to 21 × 1000 chimeric
data sets and two fusion operators), our previous study [1] answers
no to the first question. The current study aims to answer the sec-
ond question. Having tested on four classifiers and as many as 3380
face and speech bimodal fusion tasks (over 4 different protocols) on
the BANCA database and four different fusion operators, this study
shows that generating multiple chimeric databases does not degrade
nor improve the performance of a fusion operator when tested on a
real-user database with respect to using only a real-user database.
Considering the possibly expensive cost involved in collecting the
real-user multimodal data, our proposed approach is thus useful to
construct a trainable fusion classifier while at the same time being
able to overcome the problem of small size training data.
1. INTRODUCTION
Biometric authentication is a problem of verifying an identity claim
using a person’s behavioral and physiological characteristics. While
this can be achieved based on a single modality (voice or face prints
for instance), the current literature provides several approaches to-
wards studying fusion of such modalities for better performance and
robustness. One practice is to construct a large database containing
several biometric traits for each user. This, however, can be very
time-consuming, expensive, and of ethical concern. Another prac-
tice is to combine biometric modalities of a database with biometric
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modalities of another biometric database. Since both databases do
not necessarily contain the same users, such combination results in
chimeric users. From the experimental point of view, these bio-
metric modalities belong to the same person. While this practice is
commonly used in the multimodal literature, e.g., [2, 3] among oth-
ers, it was questioned whether this was a right thing to do or not
during the 2003 Workshop on Multimodal User Authentication [4].
There are at least two arguments that justify the use of chimeric
users, i.e., i) modality independence assumption – that two or more
biometric traits of a single person are often assumed independent of
each other; and ii) privacy issue – participants in the multimodal bio-
metric experiments are often not ready to let institutes keep record
of too much of their personal information (raw biometric data) at the
same place. If such information is misused, it could be dangerous,
e.g., identity theft. It is for this same reason that processed biomet-
ric features are preferred for storage to raw biometric data. Note
that the first argument is technical while the second one is ethical.
Although both arguments are equally important, the second one is
beyond an experimenter’s control and is related to the usage policy
of the database. For instance the policy should address who can use
the database and how it should be used. When a database is care-
fully designed to protect the participants’ privacy right, this issue
should be resolved. For this reason, this paper focuses on the first
argument.
In our previous study [1], we addressed the question: “Is the
performance measured on a chimeric database a good estimator of
that measured on a real-user database?”. Having conducted a con-
siderable amount of empirical experiments (21 real-user data sets
and up to 21× 1000 chimeric data sets on two fusion operators, the
answer is no. In other words, the performance based on a chimeric
database can possibly be biased. This means that, for instance, one
cannot claim that novel algorithm A is better than state-of-the-art al-
gorithm B on a real multimodal biometric authentication task if the
comparison was conducted on a chimeric database. A similar inves-
tigation was reported in [5] with the conclusion that favors the use
of chimeric users. It should be pointed out that these studies were
undertaken with the following differences: (i) the former was tested
on 21 fusion tasks whereas the latter was tested on two fusion tasks
(clean and noisy); (ii) the former engaged in a standard hypothesis
test whereas the latter did not – only the mean DET curves derived
from both real and chimeric databases were visually compared; (iii)
the former is based on a threshold dependent assessment – whereby
a threshold is optimized a priori on a development (training) set and
a performance is measured on an evaluation (test) set using the cho-
sen threshold; a similar assessment as the yearly NIST evaluation
protocols [6]) – whereas the latter is based on a threshold free as-
sessment via a DET curve; (iv) two fusion operators are considered
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Fig. 1. Left: an original bimodal fusion training data set whose
x-axis is a speech expert score and y-axis is a face expert score.
Center: a bimodal fusion training data set generated using chimeric
users. Right: a bimodal real-user test data set. This is a typi-
cal example among the 3380 fusion tasks taken from the BANCA
database. In each figure, crosses (upper right cluster) denote client
accesses and dots (lower left cluster) denote impostor accesses.
in the former and only one considered in the latter; and (v) a boot-
strap procedure was used in the latter to estimate the distribution
of performance on the real-user database and the former did not1.
While most differences are methodological, it should be remarked
that our findings show that only approximately a third of 21 fusion
data sets, independent of the fusion classifier used, reports inconsis-
tency of performance between the real-user and chimeric databases.
Hence, the inconsistency may very well not be visible with only 2
experiments.
This paper addresses another issue with respect to chimeric users:
“Can a chimeric database be exploited to improve the generalization
performance of a fusion operator on a real-user database?”. Very
often, due to lack of training data, a fusion operator has very limited
amount of data for training. Hence, by using chimeric database, one
can generate much more data to train the fusion classifier that would
then be assessed on real multimodal user scores. If this is the case,
then, even if the performance measured on a chimeric database is
biased as in [1], a chimeric database is still at least useful for other
purposes such as to help construct a fusion classifier. To verify this
hypothesis, we limit our scope to studying such effect to bimodal as
generalization to more than two modalities is direct.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 contains a de-
scription on the general methodology used; Section 3 describes the
BANCA database used; Section 4 presents the four fusion classifiers
used; and Section 5 presents the experimental outcomes.
2. METHODOLOGY
To illustrate the idea, we first plot a bimodal fusion training and test
sets in the left and right panels of Figure 1, respectively. By random
mix-and-match of (scores of) modalities according to different iden-
tities, we obtained a much larger training set as shown in the middle
panel of Figure 1.
Although this methodology is rather simple, there is still a fun-
damental question of how many chimeric users are necessary. Sup-
pose that there are N real users for which we recorded 2 modalities.
Then, in theory, in order to construct a bimodal chimeric database,
one can generate up to N×(N−1) chimeric users (by excluding the
N real users). Our initial experiments with N, 2N, 3N, . . . , (N −
1)×N (as a multiple of the user size) show that the number of users
1Recognizing that this issue is important, our on-going work takes into
account of such information but the experimental outcome does not change
the conclusion reported in [1].
has not much effect on the performance. We thus fixed this multiple
factor to 10 so that the fusion constructed on chimeric users had 10
times more data than that trained on real users.
3. DATABASE
We used the real bimodal face and speech BANCA database. Some
of the scores were obtained from [7]2 while the rest of the data,
based on face systems, are taken from [8]. These systems contain
experimental as well as the state-of-the-art systems based on Prin-
cipal Component Analysis, Linear Discriminant Analysis, Gaus-
sian Mixture Models, Hidden Markov Models, Support Vector Ma-
chines, Normalized Correlation, etc, to name a few. In the BANCA
database, there are 7 different protocols, of which we chose four:
Mc, Ua, Ud and P. The first three represent matched controlled, un-
matched adversed, unmatched degraded scenarios, respectively. The
last one is a pooled scenario containing the first three. A matched
scenario implies that the mismatch between a training and a test set
is minimal (due to using the same type of microphone, video camera
and data acquired in similar and clean conditions). There are two un-
matched scenarios: adversed and degraded. The former refers to the
mismatch due to different acquisition environment whereas the latter
refers to using a degraded acquisition device (by simulation). There
are five language subsets but only the English subset is used in this
study. By combining a speech-based biometric system with a face-
based biometric system, the first three protocols contain 840 fusion
tasks whereas the last one contains 860. In the BANCA protocols,
two groups of users are distinguished and are labeled by g1 and g2.
We used g1 as a development (training) set and g2 as an evaluation
(test) set; hence, while g1 was modified to create chimeric users, g2
was kept with real users only, in order to be able to assess perfor-
mance on real users.
4. FUSION CLASSIFIERS AND THRESHOLD
ESTIMATION
Four classifiers are used, namely Logistic Regression (LR) [9], Gaus-
sian Mixture Model (GMM) with dependent assumption [10], GMM
with independent assumption and the mean operator. Note that the
LR classifier used here is more general than the one used in [9]
(which assumes common covariance of both client and impostor dis-
tributions) but rather the standard approach as described in [11]. Let
y ≡ [y1, . . . , yM ]
T be a vector of scores consisting of M biometric
modalities. The LR classifier has the following form:
yLR ≡ P (C|y) =
1
1 + exp(−g(y))
,
where
g(y) =
MX
i=1
βiyi + β0.
We used an implementation described in [12]. The classical ap-
proach of using GMM in classification [10, Chap. 2] is to establish
a Log-likelihood ratio (LLR) test between the client and impostor
classes, i.e., k = {C, I}. The LLR takes the following forms:
ydep ≡ log
p(y|C)
p(y|I)
, (1)
2Available at “ftp://ftp.idiap.ch/pub/bengio/banca/banca scores”
for the dependent assumption and
yindep = log
Q
i
p(yi|C)Q
i
p(yi|I)
, (2)
for the independent assumption. The approximations to Eqn. (1) and
Eqn. (2) using GMM can be written as follow:
pˆ(y|k) =
NcX
c
wkcN (y|µ
k
c ,Σ
k
c ), (3)
pˆ(y|k) =
NcX
c
wkcN
“
y|µkc , (σ
k
c )
2
”
, (4)
for any y ∈ {yi|i = 1, . . . , M}, respectively, where, the c-th com-
ponent of the class conditional (denoted by k) mean vector is µk =
[µk1 , . . . , µ
k
M ]
T and its covariance matrix of dimension M × M is
Σ
k
c . The mean and variance of p(y|k) are defined similarly except
that it is single dimensional. The GMM parameters can be optimized
using the Expectation-Maximization algorithm [10] for instance and
the number of components can be tuned by validation or optimiza-
tion of a criterion, e.g., minimum description length [13]. Finally,
the fused score using the mean operator has the following form:
ymean =
1
M
MX
i=1
yi −Bi
Ai
,
where Bi and Ai are called a bias and a scaling factor, respectively.
In our implementation, both parameters are estimates of mean and
standard deviation from the training scores, respectively. The resul-
tant normalized yi score is sometimes called a z-score.
Note that the above fusion classifiers do not include a thresh-
old3. The complete model has the following decision function:
decision(y) =

accept if y > ∆
reject otherwise, (5)
where ∆ is a global decision threshold and y in our context is any of
the combined scores y ∈ {yLR, ydep, yindep, ymean} discussed be-
fore. In a threshold-dependent assessment based on Expected Per-
formance Curve [14], the ∆ is chosen to minimize, on a separate
development set, the following criterion, known as Weighted Error
Rate (WER),
∆∗ = arg min
∆
WERα(∆) (6)
where
WERα(∆) ≡ αFAR(∆) + (1− α)FRR(∆),
and α ranges from 0 to 1. This parameter balances between the costs
between FAR and FRR estimated from a development set. Note
that although not having the exact same formulation, similar crite-
ria were employed in the yearly NIST speaker evaluation plans [6]
and the BANCA protocols [15]. Using this threshold, we can then
evaluate WER for several values of α on the evaluation set. This
enables us to obtain unbiased estimates of performance since all
hyper-parameters of the fusion operator, including the threshold, are
selected on the development or a separate validation set. Note that
only a priori performances are reported here.
3The LR classifier has a bias but it is not used since the algorithm does
not explicitly optimize Equal Error Rate or any authentication-related per-
formance.
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Fig. 2. WER versus α (the lower the better) on (a) Mc (840 fusion
sets ×4 fusion operators), (b) Ua (840 × 4), (c) Ud (840 × 4) and
(d) P (860× 4) protocols. The four fusion operators are: logistic re-
gression (cross), GMM with dependent assumption (circle), GMM
with independent assumption (asterisk) and the mean operator (dia-
mond). Comparison should be made between a thin continuous line
and a thick dashed line.
5. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
Figure 2 shows pooled EPC curves of four fusion classifiers trained
on a real-user development set and an augmented chimeric-user de-
velopment set having 10 times more data than the former develop-
ment set. This gives 4×2 = 8 modes of fusion. The total statistics to
be analyzed can be summarized by WERpooled(α, p, COM, data)
for
• the performance cost α ∈ [0, 1],
• on the protocol p = {Mc, Ua, Ud, P},
• using any fusion operator COM ∈ {LR, dep, indep, mean}
and
• trained on the data ∈ {real, chim} (real or chimeric).
One can see from Figure 2 that in most cases, the generalization
performance on real users was similar whether we used real users
for training (thin continuous lines) or chimeric users (thick dashed
lines).
We then pooled all measures coming from different fusion oper-
ators in order to compare the relative performance between chimeric-
based fusion models and real user-based fusion models. This rela-
tive performance is calculated as
(WERchim −WERreal)/WERreal.
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Fig. 3. Upper rows: Relative change of pooled WER on Mc, Ua,
Ud and P protocols depicted as error bars. Each bar indicates the
2.5th and the 97.5th percentiles and is linked to each other via their
respective median. The corresponding lower rows show the propor-
tion of change < 0 (favors the operators due to chimeric users), > 0
(favors that due to real users) or = 0 (i.e., both give exactly the same
value).
Hence, a negative change implies that the fusion operator derived
from chimeric users improves over its real-user counterpart.
The results, shown in Figure 3, suggest that the generalization
performance using chimeric users is not very different from the one
using real users (the average relative change is near 0), across dif-
ferent fusion operators. However, for protocol Mc (clean condi-
tions) and Ud (degraded conditions), the fusion operator trained on
chimeric users has a higher chance (never less than 50% and 38% of
the time, respectively) of being consistently better than its real-user
counterparts across all cost of α values. Finally, a mixed perfor-
mance is observed for protocols Ua (adversed) and P (pooled over
all three scenarios). In summary, a chimeric database can have a
higher chance of improving generalization performance of a fusion
operator over not using such information, especially under matched
(clean) conditions. It does not make a fusion operator more robust
because it is not designed to do so – suggesting that other prior
knowledge such as quality information is necessary.
6. CONCLUSIONS
Although the use of virtual users is somewhat novel, it should be
mentioned that training using virtual samples in machine learning
is not new, e.g., [16, 17]. However, different from them, this paper
explores how a model can be built using a chimeric database, an ap-
proach which to the best of our knowledge, has not been investigated
before. One important conclusion from this preliminary study is that
a fusion operator derived from a chimeric-user database does not
improve nor degrade the generalization performance (on real users)
with respect to training it on real users. The advantage, however,
is that much more training data can be artificially generated thus in
this way it can overcome the lack of training data. This is especially
useful when using trainable fusion operators. Note however that, as
explained in [1], while chimeric data can be useful to train good fu-
sion operators, the obtained fusion models can only be evaluated on
real multimodal biometric data, and not on chimeric data.
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